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INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM
DIEGO RODRIGUEZ-PINZON

The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (hereinafter 'Commission') of the
Organization of American States recently released its 2001 Annual Report. In this
review I will refer to the individual complaints (Chapter III of the Report) decided by
the Commission on the merits. The Commission included 29 decisions accepting
petitions (admissible), nine decisions rejecting petitions (inadmissible), eight friendly
settlements (seven on Ecuador and one Argentina) and four reports on the merits of
cases. The Commission also submitted four cases to the Inter-American Court on
Human Rights during 2001. In its 2000 Annual Report the Commission included 22
reports on the merits and in 1999 and 1998 it released 30 and 25 reports on the merits,
respectively.
The following are the cases decided on the merits in 2001:
1

Dayra Maria Levoyer Jiminez vs Ecuador (Case No. 11.992, Inter-Am. C.H.R.,
Annual Report 2001, OEA/Ser./L/V/II.114, doc. 5 rev., 16 April 2001)

Facts of the Case
Mrs. Dayra Maria Levoyer Jim6nez, companion of the accused drug trafficker Hugo
Jorge Reyes Torres, filed a petition against the State of Ecuador for violations ofArticles
5, 7, 8, 21, and 25 of the American Convention. The Commission earlier ruled that the
case was admissible. The Commission found in her favour on all charges except that
under Article 21.
Mrs. Jim6nez was arrested without a warrant on 21 June 1992, and was held
incommunicado for 39 days. She was subsequently held without conviction for six years
before being released. On 7 April 2000, after attempts to reach a friendly settlement
with the State were found to be unsuccessful, Mrs. Jim6nez filed a request with the
Commission to begin an examination of her case on the merits.
The charges listed in the warrant, which was issued on 30-31 July 1992, were for
drug trafficking, acting as a 'front', illicit enrichment, and asset laundering (conversion
de bienes). Mrs. Jim6nez filed four writs of habeas corpus with the President of the
Supreme Court of Justice, which were not ruled upon. A fifth writ was filed in April
1998, requesting that the Mayor release Mrs. Jiminez immediately. This writ was
denied by the Constitutional Court. However, inJune 1998, the Second Division of the
Constitutional Court found that the terms specified in the law had been exceeded and
reversed the prior decision by ordering Mrs. Jiminez's immediate release. All charges
were thereby dismissed.
The State still argued that domestic remedies have not been exhausted since the
appeals and consultation process is still ongoing for each charge.
Article 7(2) and 7(3) - Legality of the detention
To determine the legality of the detention, the Commission considered three factors:
1) what are the 'conditions established beforehand by law', 2) are such conditions
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consistent with the provisions of the Convention, and 3) have such provisions been
observed here. According to the Commission, it is established in Article 56 of the
Ecuadorian Code of Criminal Conduct that detention without a warrant is only
permitted when an individual is caught while committing a crime or when a 'serious
presumption of responsibility exists'. The Commission considered it is empowered to
interpret the 'serious presumption' language for consistency with the Convention
provisions, and does so by finding that this definition is left to the police officer's
discretion. This, in effect, is a violation of Articles 7(2) and 7(3) as such since the
Convention requires the law to 'precisely and in specific detail' establish the conditions
for an arrest to take place. Thus, the Commission considered the arrest of Mrs.Jim6nez
to be a violation of Articles 7(2) and 7(3) for not being made on the grounds set forth
in Ecuador's Constitution, and because Article 56 of the Ecuadorian Code of Criminal
Conduct is 'a vague and general prescription' that does not conform to what is required
by the American Convention.
Additionally, the Commission found that the incommunicado detention of Mrs.
Jim6nez for 39 days violated Article 7(2) by contravening the State law specifying a
maximum 24-hour holding period without a charge. Finally, the Commission concluded
that a police station, such as that where Mrs. Jim6nez was held, is not a suitable facility
for pre-trial detention.
Articles 7(5) and 2 - Deprivationofpersonal liberty
The function of Article 7(5) is to enforce the State's duty to guarantee the rule of law.
A person held without trial is presumed innocent until proven otherwise, and a trial to
determine their innocence or guilt must be provided within a reasonable time. This
determination is made on a case-by-case basis using a two part test: 1) is the deprivation
of liberty without conviction justified in the light of sufficient criteria, determined
objectively and reasonably by preexisting legislation, and 2) have thejudicial authorities
acted with due diligence in the advancement of the judicial proceedings. Without such
justification, the accused must be released.
Although the seriousness of the offense and severity of the sentence are factors that
may be considered, they are not dispositive. The preexisting legislation in this respect
is Article 114 of the Ecuadorian Criminal Code, which states that persons held for more
than one-third of the maximum sentence for a conviction for the charged offense who
have not had their case discontinued or been committed to trial shall be immediately
released. Further, those persons held for more than one-half of the maximum sentence
for the charged crime who have not been sentenced shall be immediately released. Both
of these requirements are subject to an exception that excludes persons charged with
crimes under the Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances Act, such as Mrs. Jimenez.
The maximum sentence for the crimes with which Mrs. Jim6nez was charged is eight
years, which makes her six-year detention a violation of both clauses of Article 114. The
exception to this article was invalidated by the Inter-American Court in the 1997 Sudrez
Rosero Case, where the language was held to be a de jure violation of the American
Convention Article 7(5) obligation to render effective in domestic law the right to
personal liberty.

339

NQHR 3 / 2002

According to the Commission, any extension of a preventive detention of an
individual that goes beyond that permitted by domestic law constitutes a prima facie
violation of Article 7(5), regardless of the nature of the offense or complexity of the
case. Accordingly, Article 114 was rescinded by the Constitutional Court of Ecuador in
December 1997. Thus, Mrs. Jiminez was held for six months (prior to her June 1998
release) in violation of the requirement that she be judged in a reasonable time or
released under Articles 7(5) and 7(2).
Because the State failed to provide adequate domestic measures to ensure Article
7(5) in this matter they violated Article 2 of the Convention. Also, failure to arraign Mrs.
Jim6nez immediately after she was detained constituted a further violation of Article
7(5).
Articles 7(6) and 25 - Incommunicado Detention and Habeas Corpus
Any person deprived of personal liberty has the right under Article 7(6) to have
recourse to a competent court. Article 28 of the Ecuadorian Constitution permits
recourse to the Municipal Authority in such cases, but not to a court. The Commission
found a violation of Article 7(6) for the State's failure to provide adequate recourse to
a competent court, and further urged the State to take necessary steps in revising their
legislation to provide judicial recourse in cases of deprivation of personal liberty.
Additionally, Article 25 of the Convention provides that individuals have the right
to 'simple and prompt recourse (...) to a competent court or tribunal' when they feel
that their personal liberties are being deprived. The Commission specified that,
although Article 458 of the Ecuadorian Code of Criminal Procedure requires ajudge
to decide habeas corpus requests within 48 hours, a mere formality without effective
implementation does not satisfy Article 25.
The Commission considered that the four initial habeas corpus filings were ignored
or denied with delay in violation of Article 25.
Article 5(2a) - Cruel, Inhumane, and Degrading Treatment
The psychological suffering associated with incommunicado detention is considered an
exceptional instrument' that has grave effects on the detained person. The Commission
considered that the deprivation of outside communication allows to conclude that the
detainee has been subjected to cruel and inhumane treatment. The prolonged
incommunicado detention of Mrs. Jim6nez was a violation of her rights under Article
5(2a).
Article 8(1) - Determinationof Guilt within a Reasonable Time
According to the Commission, individuals are guaranteed the right to a hearing within
a reasonable time under Article 8(1). Reasonableness is determined by 1) the
complexity of the matter; 2) the procedural activity of the individual concerned and 3)
the conduct of the judicial authorities.
The State contended that it acted reasonably in light of the complexity of the case
by rapidly moving through the tribunals. The Commission considered this assertion
insufficient and found that the eight years since initiation of the case is 'well beyond the

340

HUMAN RIGHTS NEws

principle of reasonable time within which to resolve a case'. Thus, the Commission
considered these actions to be a violation of Article 8(1).
Article 8(2) - Principleof Presumption of Innocence
Mrs. Jim6nez maintained that her presumption of innocence under Article 8(2) was
violated because her preventive detention for an indefinited period was equivalent to
an anticipation of punishment, which is prohibited under universally accepted legal
principles. The Commission considered that the State violated the presumption of
innocence requirement of Article 8(2).
Article 8(4) - Non bis in idem
Article 8(4) acts as a safeguard against multiple trials for the same offense. Mrs.Jim6nez
was tried for the offense of asset laundering twice by the same judge of the Superior
Court of Quito, and once by ajudge of the Eighth Criminal Court. The additional trials
were based on expanded investigation reports. The Commission decided that these
simultaneous trials for the same offense constituted a violation of Article 8(4).
Article 21 - Right to Own Property
Mrs. Jim6nez contended that her confiscated property would not be returned to her if
her case is provisionally dismissed as distinguished from if it reaches a final judgment.
In the latter case, her goods would be returned to her. However, she argues that if no
finaljudgment is reached, the goods will not be returned, thus violating Article 21. The
Commission rejected this charge and pointed out that a final judgment has the same
effect as a definitive dismissal, and that both bear resjudicataeffect. Thus, in either case,
the goods should be returned to Mrs. Jiminez in accordance with Article 21.
Conclusion and Recommendations
The Commission concluded that the State violated the right to human treatment
(Article 5), the right to personal liberty (Article 7), the right to due process (Article 25),
and the general obligation to respect and ensure these rights under Article 1(1) of the
American Convention. The Commission thereby recommended that the State 1) grant
full reparations and adequate compensation to Mrs. Jim6nez; 2) order an investigation
to determine responsibility for the violations herein identified and punish the
individuals responsible and 3) take necessary steps to reform the habeascorpus legislation
and enact such reforms with immediate effect.
2

ExtrajudicialExecutions and Forced Disappearances of Persons, Peru (Case 10.247,
Inter-Am. C.H.R., Annual Report 2001, OEA/Ser./L/V/II. 114, doc. 5 rev., 16 April
2001)

Facts
The Inter-American Commission received twenty-five petitions alleging human rights
violations of 119 people by the State of Peru between 1984 and 1993. Under Article 40
of the American Convention, and based on the common fact patterns and alleged
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perpetrator of these abuses, the Commission decided to combine these twenty-five cases
to discern ajoint resolution.
The claims allege the existence of a systematic practice of extrajudicial, summary or
arbitrary executions or forced disappearances by agents of the State during a period of
political instability. Information supporting this allegation is contained in the
Commission's 1993 Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Peru. Additionally, the
United Nations Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions,
Mr. Bacre Waly Ndiaye, submitted a 1994 and 1995 report discussing the rondas
campesinas and the death squads committing human rights violations in Peru. These
reports were considered by the Commission in making its final determination.
The alleged acts took place while Peru was in a state of emergency due to the closing
down and occupation of the Congress and Supreme Court on 5 April 1992. Insurgent
group members, or those linked to them, were targeted as part of the State's counterinsurgency efforts. The United Nations Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary
Disappearances received over 3,000 cases during this time period, largely related with
the Government's fight against Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path).
However, a significant number of cases involved persons not connected to any
subversive groups, such as those who, for instance, reached a checkpoint and failed to
produce valid identification. Additionally, most of the acts were carried out by agents
of the State with no attempt to hide their official capacity. Witnesses were present in
most cases when uniformed agents arrived to seize the alleged suspect. After the suspect
was detained, the family was unable to obtain information about their loved one since
the State often denied their detention.
To further complicate matters, the State passed Act No. 26.479 (the 'Amnesty Act')
in 1995, which granted amnesty to all members of security forces and civilian personnel
accused, investigated, indicted, prosecuted, or convicted for violations of human rights
between 1980 and 1995. Also, Act No. 26.492 prevented the judiciary from ruling on
the legality of this law.
PriliminaryObjections on Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies
According to the Commission, the State has the benefit of raising the exhaustion of
remedies requirement, and thus may expressly or tacitly waive that right. The objection
must be timely submitted during the first stages of the procedure. Also, the State must
explain what domestic remedies are available and make a showing of their effectiveness.
The Commission applied Articles 46(2)(c) and (a) and found that the State did not
invoke this objection in a timely manner during the first stages of the procedure, and
thus implicitly waived its right to raise such objection. Additionally, between seven and
sixteen years passed for each of these complaints and none has reached finaljudgment,
constituting an 'unwarranted delay in rendering final judgment'. Furthermore, the
normal six-month time limit for submission of a complaint is not relevant as a result of
the application of the Article 46(2)(c) and (a) exceptions. Also, the Commission
attempted a friendly settlement of the claims under Article 48(1)(f) butwas unsuccessful.

342

HUMAN RIGHTS NEws

I

Evidence
The Commission asserted that special standards for evaluating evidence in a human
rights court exist, which empower them to'weigh the evidence freely and to determine
the amount of proof necessary to support the judgment'. The Commission thereby
relied on the aforementioned reports to discern a pattern of systematic disappearances
caused by the State. Those facts that have been alleged in the petition, which the State
has not responded to within the maximum time frame allowed by Article 34(5), 'shall
be presumed to be true'. According to the Commission, the burden of proof in cases of
detention or systematic practice of the human rights violations lies with the State.
Therefore, the Commission presumed that the victims were executed or disappeared
by acts of Peruvian State agents and the State has the burden to present evidence on the
contrary to avoid responsibility. Due to the lack of active participation by the State, and
because of its lack of response, or an ambiguous or elusive response to the allegations,
the Commission concluded that the allegations in the complaint were true.
Discussion
Taking the facts as true and undisputed by the State, and rejecting the State's
exhaustion of domestic remedies defense, the Commission found clear evidence of a
systematic policy by the State to conduct extrajudicial executions and disappearances,
and to cover up those human rights violations.
Articles 4(1) and 1(1) of the American Convention, as well as common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions and the 1979 Peruvian Constitution recognise the right to life of
all persons. The Commission concluded that the State and the parties acting through
it acted in violation of the obligation to protect the right to life through the execution
and forced disappearance of persons. The State did not protect these victims by
adopting measures to prevent these practices, ending the practices once they had
begun, or adopting measures to punish the perpetrators of these violations after their
commission. Thus, the State violated Article 4 of the American Convention.
Articles 7(1) - (3) guarantee protection of the right to personal liberty. Detention
without legal justification or for improper purposes violates the right to personal
liberty. The Commission considered the fact that Peru was in a state of emergency at
the time of these illegal detentions and thus would find some justification for a
suspension of laws under Article 27. However, the exception to the protection of
personal liberty is not a blanket provision, and 'can never be total'. The sole purpose
of a detention under these circumstances must be the prevention of flight of a suspected
criminal. The presumption of innocence remains despite the use of this exception, thus
requiring prompt delivery to trial of any detainee. Furthermore, under Articles 7(5) and
(6), kidnapping itself is a form of illegal deprivation of liberty since by nature it prevents
the detainee from being heard before ajudge. Thus, the Commission indicated that the
State acted in violation of Article 7.
Article 5 guarantees the right to humane treatment, including freedom from torture.
The Commission found that the alleged disappearances created psychological torture
for both the direct victims and their families, who were unaware of their fate.
Additionally, the State did not challenge allegations of physical abuse marks on several
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of the corpses, nor did it challenge the allegations of torture. Thus, the Commission
concluded that the State had violated Article 5.
Article 3 guarantees the right of every person to be recognised juridical personality
before the law. The Commission found that the disappearance of persons denies such
right and thus concluded that the State violated Article 3.
Article 19 guarantees the rights of the child. Four of the twenty-five cases refer to the
abuse of the human rights of minors. Taking the allegations as true, the Commission
concluded that the State violated Article 19 by failing to guarantee the protection of
minors from torture and execution.
Articles 25(1) and 8(1) provide the right tojudicial protection and a fair trial. Formal
protection without effective implementation is not a sufficient guarantee of these rights.
The Inter-American Court has held that when a protected right or liberty has been
violated, '[t]he State has a legal duty (...) to take reasonable steps (...) to identify those

responsible, to impose the appropriate punishment and to ensure the victim adequate
compensation'. An investigation must include an adequate autopsy, collection and
analysis of all physical and documentary evidence, and statements from witnesses. The
Commission concluded that the State violated Articles 25(1) and 8(1) due to the lack of
effective investigation and the significant delays involved, which prevented the families
from receiving adequate due process.
Finally, the Commission concluded that the State failed to meet its obligations under
the American Convention and thus, is in violation of Article 1(1). These obligations
include respecting the rights and freedoms of individuals within their jurisdiction, and
ensuring their free exercise of these rights and freedoms.
Conclusion and Post-ConclusionActivities
The Commission concluded that the State of Peru is responsible for violations of the
right to life, the right to a fair trial, the right tojudicial protection, the right to personal
liberty, the right to humane treatment, the duty to prevent and punish torture, the right
of recognition of persons before the law, the rights of the child, and the duty to respect
the rights enshrined in the Convention. Therefore, the Commission recommended that
the State: 1) void any judicial decision or legislation that tends to impede investigation
into the actions herein described; 2) carry out a complete and impartial investigation
of these executions and disappearances; 3) adopt measures that will adequately
compensate victims' families and 4) accede to the Inter-American Convention on Forced
Disappearance of Persons. In April 2001, the State of Peru established a Truth
Commission to review the activities of the State between May 1980 and December 2000.
'The Truth Commission will prepare proposals for full reparations and the restoration
of dignity to the victims of severe violations of human rights, and their relatives'. Also,
an investigation by the Public Defender into the disappearance of persons between
1980-1996 has been launched. Peru also signed the Inter-American Convention on
Forced Disappearance of Persons in January 2001, and is awaiting Congressional
ratification.
Consistent with Article 46, the Commission will continue to evaluate measures taken
by the State to implement these recommendations, and requests quarterly reports from
the State.
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I

Milton Garcia Fajardo et. al. vs Nicaragua (Case No. 11.381, Inter-Am. C.H.R.,
Annual Report 2001, OEA/Ser./L/V/II.114, doc. 5 rev., 16 April 2001)

Facts
A petition was filed on behalf of 142 dismissed customs office workers in Nicaragua on
7June 1994. After unsuccessful negotiations with the Ministry of Labour, these workers
went on strike in May of 1993. The Ministry found that Article 227 of the Labour Code
prohibited public or social service workers from striking, and thus held the strike to be
illegal. On petition to the Court of Appeals seeking an Amparo remedy, the workers
received an interlocutory decision ordering the customs service to suspend any dismissal
of its workers. Nevertheless, the customs service did dismiss these 142 workers, made
up of mostly local labour leaders. The petition also stated that the police used excessive
force during the strike on 9 and 10 June 1993. Approximately one year after the
Amparo remedy was filed, the Supreme Court ofJustice ruled in favour of the Ministry
of Labour and confirmed the illegality of the strike, largely based on evidence from a
strike that took place in 1992 that involved criminal activity.
The petitioners argued that the State of Nicaragua violated their rights to humane
treatment (Article 5), a fair trial (Article 8), compensation (Article 10), freedom of
association (Article 16), and judicial protection (Article 25). The State contended that
this case should be dismissed since it is a duplicate proceeding with the present ILO
Trade Union Freedom Committee case, and that the petitioners failed to exhaust
domestic remedies prior to filing this petition. Additionally, the State claimed that the
workers committed criminal acts during the strike, that the strike was illegal, and that
most workers have been reinstated to theirjobs.
The State rejected any possibility of a friendly settlement. Furthermore, the
petitioners argued that there is no proceeding before the ILO regarding this particular
issue.
The Commission concluded that, with respect to all 142 complainants, the State
violated the right to a fair trial, judicial protection, and the economic, social, and
cultural rights protected by Articles 8, 25, and 26 of the American Convention.
Additionally, the Commission concluded that, with respect to 13 complainants, the State
violated the right to humane treatment under Article 5.
The Commission published this report in accordance with Article 51(3) based on
information that the State has not implemented the Commission's recommendations
as of 6 July 2001.
Discussion
The Commission found that the State violated the right to humane treatment in Article
5 based on evidence that the police used excessive force on peaceful protestors. The
Commission relied on evidence from news reports and from a report that one security
force agent was convicted of abuse of authority during the strike.
The Commission also found that the State violated the right to a fair trial embodied
in Articles 8(1) and 25 based on the nearly one-year delay between the filing of the
Amparo remedy and the decision of the Supreme Court. Nicaraguan law requires the
Supreme Court to decide an Amparo petition within 45 days of filing. According to the
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Inter-American Court, there are three issues when determining the 'reasonable time'
for a decision by a court: 1) the complexity of the matter; 2) the judicial activity of the
interested party and 3) the behaviour of the judicial authorities. The process involved
in this case was straightforward and did not require many special measures. Thus, there
is no justification for this delay.
Additionally, the State violated Article 25(2)(c) by ignoring the June 1993 Court of
Appeals decision ordering the suspension of dismissals, the clarification decision of that
same court the following week, the Director General of Labor's order to reinstate the
workers, and the September, 1993 order by the Supreme Court to comply with the
Court of Appeals suspension. This refusal to comply on the part of the State rendered
ineffective the judicial recourse of the parties, and thereby violated the Article 25
requirement of free access to judicial recourse.
The Commission rejected the petitioner's claim that the State violated the right to
compensation for miscarriage ofjustice (Article 10). Although the Commission agreed
that the Amparo remedy ruling by the Supreme Court restricted the petitioners rights,
it did 'not constitute a conviction based on a miscarriage ofjustice under [this article]'.
The Commission found that the State violated the Article 26 protection of economic,
social and cultural rights by curtailing worker's rights. Although Nicaragua is a State
Party to the Protocol of San Salvador, which recognises and protects these rights, it has
not yet ratified it. However, Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
requires States that have signed a treaty, despite the lack of ratification, to refrain from
implementing legislation that would contravene the purpose of the treaty. The
measures adopted by the State here contravened the purpose of the Protocol.
The Commission rejects the petitioner's claim that the State violated the Article 16
right to free association. According to the Commission, the fact that the customs
workers were dismissed as a result of the strike does not necessarily imply that the State
prevented them from associating to strike or that they were prevented from exercising
their rights as members of a union.
Conclusion and Recent Developments

The Commission found that the State violated the right to humane treatment in Article
5 with respect to 13 petitioners. Additionally, the Commission found that the State
violated the rights to a fair trial, judicial protection, and economic, social and cultural
rights, under Articles 8, 25, and 26 of the American Convention with respect to 142
petitioners. Finally, the Commission found that the State violated its generic obligations
under Article 1(1). The Commission rejected the petitioner's claims of a right to
compensation and freedom of association under Articles 10 and 16. The Commission
recommended that the State conduct complete, impartial and effective investigations
into those who inflicted injury upon the 13 petitioners whose Article 5 rights were
violated during the strike, and punish those responsible. Additionally, the State should
adopt measures to provide timely and adequate compensation for the 142 victims whose
human rights were violated herein.
The State thereafter instructed its Interior Minister to begin the recommended
investigations into these violations. The Commission found, however, that '[c]riminal
action needs to be brought, and the judicial authorities will be responsible for the
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proceedings'. The use of administrative personnel to carry out these investigations is
insufficient.
Dissent of CommissionerDr.Julio Prado Vallejo
Commissioner Prado Vallejo argued that the State violated Articles 8(1) and 10 of the
American Convention. Article 8(1) requiresjudges to give rulings based on the evidence
in the record and not based on personal motivations or knowledge unrelated to the
case. Because the Supreme Court in this case based their decision in part on acts that
allegedly took place prior to those at issue in the case, the Commissioner concluded that
the court committed a miscarriage ofjustice and violated the petitioners' right to a fair
trial. As a result, the Commissioner concluded that the petitioners' should be provided
adequate reparations by the State for this harm, pursuant to Article 10 of the American
Convention.
4

Joseph Thomas vs Jamaica (Case No. 12.183, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Annual Report
2001, OEA/Ser./L/V/II.114, doc. 5 rev., 16 April 2001)

Facts/Background
Joseph Thomas was convicted on 11 October 1996 for theJanuary 1995 capital murder
of Arthur McFarlane and Junior Spencer, which took place during an armed robbery.
He was identified by two witnesses without an identification parade, and was brought
to trial in 1996.
Capital murder in Jamaica includes murder pursuant to a robbery, and carries a
mandatory death sentence. This mandatory provision was stipulated in the preIndependence Constitution of Jamaica and, under Jamaican law, is not subject to
challenge.
Mr. Thomas was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death by hanging. His
appeal to the Court of Appeal of Jamaica was dismissed in December 1997, and his
petition for Special Leave to Appeal as a Poor Person to the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council was dismissed in April 1999. He did not pursue a Constitutional Motion
in the domestic courts due to his indigence and the fact that legal aid is not available
for these proceedings. Thus, the law firm of Campbell Chambers, on behalf of Mr.
Thomas, filed this petition with the Commission.
Mr. Thomas contended that the State ofJamaica violated Articles 4, 5, and 8 of the
American Convention by imposing a mandatory death penalty, preventing access to
mercy proceedings, subjecting him to inhumane detention conditions and style of
execution, and permitting a conviction without an identification parade and with biased
jury instructions.
The State argued that their mandatory death penalty is applied only to the most
serious crimes, such as this one. Also, they contended that full access to mercy
proceedings is available, that the conditions of detention are not inhumane, that death
by hanging involves no less humanity than other forms of execution, and that it is for
the domestic appeals court to decide questions of fair trial, not for the Commission.
The Commission concluded that the State violated Mr. Thomas' rights under Articles
1, 2, 4, 5, and 8 of the American Convention.
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Discussion
The Commission found that the petition was admissible and that there was no need to
exhaust domestic remedies since the State did not raise this claim as a defense and
therefore has explicitly or tacitly waived it. The Commission reviewed the merits under
a standard of heightened scrutiny, whereby the parties' allegations were subjected to an
enhanced level of scrutiny to ensure that any death sentence levied complies with the
American Convention.
The Commission concluded that the State violated Mr. Thomas' rights under Articles
4(1), 5(1), 5(2), 8(1), as well as 1(1) and 2 of the Convention, by imposing a mandatory
death sentence for his crime. The Jamaican court sentenced Mr. Thomas 'based solely
upon the category of crimes for which he had been found responsible', and failed to
take into account any mitigating circumstances in accordance with the requirement that
death sentences be individualised. This broad application goes against the requirement
that the death penalty be applied in a restrictive fashion.
Article 4(6) provides the right of those sentenced to death to 'apply for amnesty,
pardon, or commutation of sentence'. The Commission found that the State violated
this provision based on the inability of Mr. Thomas to adequately or effectively
participate in the mercy process. Jamaican law formally adheres to Article 4(6),
however, these legal requirements were never extended to Mr. Thomas.
Articles 5(1) and (2) provide the right to have physical, mental, and moral integrity
respected and to be free from cruel, unusual, or degrading punishment or treatment.
The Commission found that the State violated these provisions by subjecting Mr.
Thomas to numerous unsanitary or inhumane conditions while in detention, including
a lack of functioning toilets, no electric light, and poorly cooked food rations. The
testimony of the State directly contradicted that of Mr. Thomas regarding prison
conditions; however, the Commission accepted the testimony of Mr. Thomas because
it applied specifically to his prison conditions, as distinguished from the State's general
description of prison conditions.
Article 8 provides the right to a fair trial. The Commission founds that the State
violated this right when the judge in Mr. Thomas' case 'manifestly violated his
obligation of impartiality' during his jury instructions, and based on the absence of an
identification parade. The judge's instructions to the jury included the statement: 'I do
not anticipate you having any problem there that it was the accused who killed him'.
The Commission concluded that in an objective light, these jury instructions created a
clear danger of bias and inhibited trial by an impartial tribunal.
Conclusions and Recommendations
The Commission concluded that the State violated Mr. Thomas' rights under Articles
4(1), 5(1), 5(2), 8(1), 1(1), and 2, with regard to the imposition of a mandatory death
sentence. Further, the State violated Mr. Thomas' rights under Articles 4(6), 1(1), and
2, with regard to the failure to provide an effective right to apply for pardon, amnesty,
or commutation of sentence. The State also violated Mr. Thomas' rights under Articles
5(1), 5(2), and 1(1), with regard to the conditions of his detention. Finally, the State
violated Mr. Thomas' rights under Articles 8(1), 8(2), and 1(1), with regard to the
improper jury instructions provided during his trial.
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The Commission recommended that the State: 1) grant Mr. Thomas a re-trial in
accordance with the due process protections of Article 8 or, if not feasible, release him
with compensation; 2) adopt legislative measures to ensure that the death penalty is not
imposed in contravention to the requirements ofArticles 4, 5, and 8; 3) adopt legislative
measures to ensure that the right to apply for mercy under Article 4(6) is given effect
and 4) adopt legislative measures to ensure that Mr. Thomas' detention conditions
comport with the standards of humane treatment required by Article 5.
Concurring Opinion of Commission Hilio Bicudo

Commissioner Bicudo agreed with the findings of the Commission, but elaborated on
the use of the death penalty in the Americas, concluding that '[t]he elimination of a life
could be deemed torture or cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment' under the
American Convention. The Commissioner believes that the tolerance of the death
penalty expressed in the American Convention should not be construed to mean that
it does not violate the right to life or the right to freedom from torture also expressed
therein.

V

AFRICA
RACHEL MURRAY

1

ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY/AFRICAN UNION

The African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child under the
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child met for the first time from 29
April - 2 May 2002. It reviewed its draft Rules of Procedure, which are to be further
amended at the next meeting of the Committee, and Draft Guidelines for Initial
Reports of State Parties.
2

AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS

The 31" Ordinary Session of the African Commission was held from 2 - 16 May in
Pretoria, South Africa. It was attended by a large number of NGOs and over 30 States.
A number of NGOs applied for observer status and the Commission granted this to five
organisations. Affiliated status was granted to the national human rights institutions
from Mauritius, Cameroon and Togo.
Reports submitted by States under Article 62 of the Charter and examined at the
session were those of Mauritania, Lesotho, Cameroon and Togo.
Among statements and requests by NGOs to the Commission were concerns of the
situation in numerous African States including Burkina Faso, Kenya, Mauritania,
Nigeria, Tanzania and Zimbabwe. Following the trend at previous sessions, States
requested, and were permitted, to respond to allegations raised by these organisations.
In their interventions some States also responded to decisions which had been made by
the Commission on communications brought against them. NGOs also made requests
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